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The Future of Law as a Profession
Nancy J. Moore*
For far too many years, lawyers and commentators have
debated whether law is a profession or merely a business.1 The
so-called business-profession dichotomy2 is somewhat of a
misnomer.3 For many, maybe most lawyers, law is clearly a
business in the sense that these lawyers seek to maximize their
individual wealth as much (or as little) as other business
persons.4 More importantly perhaps, lawyers in private practice
Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
See generally Nancy J. Moore, Review Essay: Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987
AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 773, 774 (1987).
2 See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of
the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century
Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2005). A draft of my paper was presented
at a panel organized by Professor Levine for the International Legal Ethics Conference
VII, held on July 14–16, 2016 in New York City. The panel was entitled “International
Perspectives on the Business/Profession Dichotomy,” drawing on Professor Levine’s
seminal article on the topic. See Fordham Univ. Sch. Law, International Perspectives on
the Business/Profession Dichotomy (Program), FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. LAW,
https://www.fordham.edu/info/25018/globalization_and_the_legal_profession/8033/interna
tional_perspectives_on_the_businessprofession_dichotomy_program
[http://perma.cc/PK43-LHLG].
3 See, e.g., Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law
Practice Means Business, 27 PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 465, 465 (2008) (“[L]aw has almost
always been an occupation that displays characteristics of both business and profession,
with changes in emphasis over time.”).
4 See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce & Adam Winer, Destabilizing the Business-Profession
Dichotomy: Louis Brandeis on Professionalism and Identity at 1 (Preliminary Draft,
Mar. 27, 2017) (“[E]mpirical studies indicate that many lawyers tend to think of
themselves as maximizing profits and as hired guns with little responsibility to the public
good in their representation of clients.”) (on file with author). According to Pearce and
Winer, Justice Brandeis viewed law as an occupation that “was part of the market,” but
one that was not exclusively defined by the market. Id. at 14. Indeed, according to
Brandeis, “[a] condition of professional success was applying efficiency and excellence to
the work to the tasks of lawyers, seeking profit, and earning a high income”; however, he
also believed that “a profession was an occupation ‘pursued largely for others and not
merely for one’s self . . . in which the amount of financial return is not the [only] accepted
measure of success.’” Id. at 14–15. Brandeis also believed that “business, too, could be a
profession” in that it is “rich in opportunity for the exercise of man’s finest and most
varied mental faculties and moral qualities.” Id. at 18.
Some commentators are more critical of lawyers who are motivated more by
making money than by doing good. See, e.g., Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in
Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice
Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 706–07 (1998) (describing how “[f]or lawyers, money is
increasingly the be-all and end-all” and how “the lives of senior lawyers—particularly
those in the elite firms—have become dominated by the pursuit of billable hours”); Kristin
L. Fortin, Reviving the Lawyer’s Role as Servant Leader: The Professional Paradigm and a
*
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widely acknowledge that adopting improved business practices is
critical to providing competent legal services.5 The question
remains however, whether, unlike some other commercial
occupations, law is also a profession and if so, what is the future
for the professional aspects of legal practice in the United States
and elsewhere?
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Commission on
Professionalism concluded that an occupation constitutes a profession
when: (1) the “practice requires substantial intellectual training and
the use of complex judgments”; (2) “clients cannot adequately
evaluate the quality of the service, [and therefore] they must
trust those they consult”; (3) “the client’s trust presupposes that
the practitioner’s self-interest is overbalanced by devotion to
serving both the client’s interest and the public good”; and (4) “the
occupation is self-regulating—that is, organized in such a way as
to assure the public and the courts that its members are
competent, do not violate their client’s trust, and transcend their
own self-interest.”6 Although other attributes are sometimes
noted,7 the overriding theme appears to be dedication to serve
the public good.8
Some believe that to constitute a true profession, members of
the occupation must personally serve the public interest by
consistently placing the needs of the community above their own
selfish interests9—in other words, that lawyers and other
professionals must be more altruistic than other business

Lawyer’s Ethical Obligation to Inform Clients About Alternative Dispute Resolution, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 595–97 (2009) (describing how financial success has become
many lawyers’ only goal).
5 See, e.g., Judith A. McMorrow, In Defense of the Business of Law, 40 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 459, 461 (2012); Frederick L. Trilling, The Strategic Application of Business
Methods to the Practice of Law, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 13, 14 (1998).
6 A.B.A. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, “ . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:”
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 1, 10 (1986),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/professionalism/Stanley_Com
mission_Report.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/76VW-XLJL].
7 For example, some cite “admission to practice by a qualifying licensure,” as well as
“a code of ethics imposing standards qualitatively and extensively beyond those that
prevail or are tolerated in the marketplace,” as well as “a system of discipline of its
members for violation of the code of ethics.” Freeman v. Freeman, 311 N.E. 2d 480, 483
(N.Y. 1974).
8 See, e.g., A.B.A. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 6, at 10 (“The term
refers to a group . . . pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public
service – no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood.
Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the primary purpose.”).
9 See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Implications of Globalization for the Professional Status
of Lawyers in the United States and Elsewhere, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217, 220 (2012)
[hereinafter Implications of Globalization] (citing works by Julius Cohen and
Tom Morgan).
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persons. If so, then there is considerable skepticism that this has
ever been the case.10
In my own writing on professionalism, however, I have
focused on the criterion of self-regulation—the fact that
professions are permitted to be, if not totally self-governing, at
least more self-governing than other occupations.11 True, it is
courts and not bar associations that oversee the regulation of
legal practice in the United States, including admission to
practice and lawyer discipline;12 however, given both the
influence of lawyers on judges, who are themselves lawyers, and
the status of judicially adopted codes of conduct as law, lawyers
are in fact more self-governing than other U.S. professionals.13
Professions are permitted to be more self-governing than
other occupations because they have persuaded society that it is
in the public interest to allow them to do so.14 But society can
change its mind, as it did in the United Kingdom, when in 2007
Parliament passed the Legal Services Act and dramatically
changed the way in which the legal professions are regulated in
England and Wales.15 Among other reforms, the Legal Services
Act created an independent agency to oversee the lawyer
disciplinary process and to assume primary responsibility for
consumer complaints; moreover, this agency is required to have a
chairperson and a majority of its members who are nonlawyers.16
10 See id. at 221 (citing work of Tom Morgan); see also Nancy J. Moore,
Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 AMER. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 773, 779 (1987) (“The
notion that professions are more likely than other trades to put public interest above selfinterest is often met with considerable derision.”).
11 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 9, at 222 (“[S]o long as the public permits the
occupation to be self-regulating, the occupation would appear, as a matter of descriptive
reality, to constitute ‘a profession’”); John Flood, The Re-landscaping of the Legal
Profession: Large Law Firms and Professional Re-regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC. 507, 509
(2011) (“Self-regulation is traditionally a key component of occupational control and a core
objective for professional projects.”).
12 Outside the United States, lawyers may be subject to more direct regulation by
state legislatures; however, local bar associations have control over the investigation and
prosecution of lawyer misconduct. See CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW
INITIATIVE, PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, CEELI CONCEPT
PAPER SERIES 7–11 (Maya Goldstein Bolocan ed., 2002).
13 See Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7,
14–15 (1989).
14 See Moore, supra note 10, at 784; see also, e.g., Flood, supra note 11, at 509–10
(“Overall professional self-regulation has been seen as part of a broader regulative
bargain where the state has granted professions a high degree of autonomy in organizing
their own affairs in exchange for the professions’ pledge to guarantee quality and put
public interest before their own.”).
15 See Moore, supra note 9, at 224–25.
16 Id. For a detailed description of the regulatory reforms in both the United
Kingdom and in Australia, see generally Judith L. Maute, Global Continental Shifts to a
New Governance Paradigm in Lawyer Regulation and Consumer Protection: Riding the
Wave, in ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERS AND LEGAL ETHICS: REIMAGINING THE
PROFESSION 11 (Francesca Bartlett et al. eds., 2011); see also Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on
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The legislation also overrode prior professional rules by
permitting lawyers to collaborate with nonlawyers in the
provision of legal or multidisciplinary services.17
So what is the future of the legal profession in the
United States?
Of course, it will be more difficult for society to enact
dramatic reforms in the United States than it was in the United
Kingdom. This is because U.S. lawyers are primarily regulated
by fifty state courts as opposed to state legislatures or the federal
government.18 Congress almost certainly has the authority to
regulate lawyers, but so far has not shown the will to do so,
except in an occasional, piecemeal fashion.19
Putting these practical questions aside, what other
considerations are likely to affect the future of legal professionalism
in the United States?
According to some critics, such as Tom Morgan, lawyer
self-regulation has not benefitted the public.20 As a result, these
critics believe that right-thinking citizens, including lawyers,
should favor a form of deregulation. In other words, let lawyers
be viewed as primarily commercial actors and be regulated in the
same manner as other commercial actors.21
I do not currently favor this position, as I am not yet
convinced that lawyer self-regulation has produced more public
detriments than benefits. I concede that the legal profession has
often put the interests of lawyers ahead of the public,22 but I also

the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and Australian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in
Regulating Law Practice, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13, 14 (2009).
17 See Moore, supra note 9, at 224–25.
18 See Schneyer, supra note 16, at 13–17, 24–25.
19 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335,
337 (1994).
20 See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 66 (2010) (“Law
in America is not a profession – and that’s a good thing.”). For a list of other publications
by Morgan to the same effect, see Moore, supra note 9, at 217 n.2. See also id. at 228–29
(describing Morgan’s view that “the concept of law as a profession and lawyers as
professionals is good neither for lawyers . . . nor for the public at large”) (footnotes
omitted). Of course, Morgan is not alone. See, e.g., CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT W.
CRANDALL & VIKRAM MAHESHRI, FIRST THING WE DO, LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE
LAWYERS 5 (2011); David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability
Forces to Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 203, 207 (2004).
21 See Moore, supra note 9, at 228–29; see also, e.g., WINSTON ET AL., supra note 20;
Barnhizer, supra note 20; cf. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An
Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 429, 433 (calling for complete deregulation of lawyers except for incourt appearances).
22 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 10, at 786 (detailing some of the dangers of
professional self-regulation).
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believe that lawyers have enacted and enforced improvements in
the rules of professional conduct and other forms of regulation,
including the professionalization of the lawyer disciplinary system.23
If I am right, then deregulation is not necessarily the
preferred path for the future.24 And along these lines, I take
heart from the fact that the United Kingdom has not removed
lawyers from the regulatory process, but rather permits lawyer
organizations to function as front-line regulators, albeit with a
significant amount of external oversight.25
Similarly, I have no problem with, and would likely support
limited regulatory reform in the United States, including having
Congress enact certain limited measures to solve various
problems that state courts have been unable or unwilling to
solve; for example, uniform minimalist standards for lawyer
advertising and solicitation and perhaps even uniform standards
for confidentiality and conflicts of interest.26
But there are other, perhaps more pressing, problems facing
the U.S. legal profession today. For example, will globalization
force changes that are already occurring outside the United
States, including nonlawyer ownership of law firms and
multi-disciplinary practices?27 Advances in technology have
23 See Moore, supra note 9, at 229–32; see also Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can
Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS (forthcoming 2017) (organized bar continues to act in altruistic and public-serving
ways at the same time it acts in self-interested and protectionist ways).
24 See generally Moore, supra note 9, at 232–37 (suggesting several reasons why U.S.
lawyers and lawyer organizations should consider “reprofessionalism, along the lines
suggested by the current reforms in the U.K. and Australia”); see also, Julian Webb, The
Dynamics of Professionalism: The Moral Economy of English Legal Practice – and Some
Lessons for New Zealand?, 16 WAIKATO L. REV. 21, 37 (2008) (noting that the debate
preceding the adoption of the Legal Services Act of 2007 had moved “beyond a crude
deregulation agenda” toward regulations designed to be “efficient, systematic, transparent
and accountable”).
25 See Moore, supra note 9, at 224–27, 228, 233–35. For an argument that
maintaining a significant level of professional self-regulation in the United Kingdom was
the result of lobbying by English law firms based on their desire to remain competitive in
Europe, where professionalism remains a core value among business clients, see
Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law Practice Means
Business, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 465, 469 (2008).
26 See, e.g., Janine Griffiths-Baker & Nancy J. Moore, Regulating Conflicts of Interest
in Global Law Firms: Peace in Our Time?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2560 (2012) (“[I]t
may be time for Congress to impose national standards in selective areas, such as conflict
of interest rules for lawyers engaged in multistate or multinational practice.”).
27 See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, Putting the Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice
of Law in a Global Context, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2903, 2933 (2014) (discussing global
pressures on the scope of the legal profession’s monopoly, including “governmental
pressure, market developments, or both”); cf. James E. Moliterno, The Trouble With
Lawyer Regulation, 62 EMORY L.J. 885, 904 (2013) (“[T]he need to compete [with U.K law
firms]” will drive U.S. law firms to lobby the ABA and Congress for the opportunity to
compete more effectively in global markets.”); cf. Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking
Regulation and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 38
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already lead to a significant presence of online legal services such
as LegalZoom in the United States.28 Many of these services are
owned and operated by nonlawyers, presumably with the
assistance of lawyers in creating the software programs.29
Can lawyer self-regulation survive these changes? Or will
lawyers and nonlawyers inevitably become so entangled30 that
lawyer self-regulation will become meaningless? This is where
U.S. lawyers will need to be the most creative in determining
whether the profession can continue to regulate lawyers in a
world of increasing integration of legal service providers. Is
this possible?
Assume, for example, that U.S. jurisdictions are eventually
forced by competition to permit nonlawyer ownership of law firms
and multi-disciplinary practices.31 Can lawyer self-regulation
work in these types of practices? Both the United Kingdom and
Australia seem to think so. In these countries, lawyers are still
bound by regulations applicable to other lawyers, and there must
be at least one lawyer in each of these “alternative business
structures” who is responsible for ensuring that the professional
rules are followed in the provision of legal services.32
(2012) (discussing wide range of law and law-related services provided by nonlawyers or
by lawyers in combination with nonlawyers, particularly in the corporate sector and the
extent to which globalization has increased this trend).
28 See, e.g., Lauren Moxley, Note, Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights
Approach to Reforming the Lawyer’s Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 553, 553 (2015).
29 LegalZoom was created by two lawyers who formerly practiced at Sullivan
& Cromwell and Skadden Arps. Id. at 556. It makes sense to infer that lawyers play a
significant role in product development, although LegalZoom’s website does not say so.
Indeed, although the vice-president in charge of Legal Research and Product
Development is a graduate of Yale Law School (see Vanessa Davis, LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/in/vanessa-davis-0285a74 [http://perma.cc/NE9V-EEYE]), the
LegalZoom website does not describe her as either a licensed lawyer or a law school
graduate. About Us, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/about-us [http://perma.cc/
4R57-KM4Y]. LegalZoom probably chooses not to advertise the role that lawyers play in
product development in order to avoid consumers relying on the company as providing
legal services. Any such reliance would make it more difficult for LegalZoom to defend
against unauthorized practice of law challenges. See generally Moxley, supra note 28.
30 See, e.g., Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer
Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 14 (2016) (“As legal
and non-legal work becomes more integrated, and entangled, within the firm employees
may also be more likely to engage in the unauthorized practice of law or share
confidential client information across different departments of the company.”); Benjamin
H. Barton, Some Early Thoughts on Liability Standards for Online Providers of Legal
Services, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 541 (2015) (describing various online legal service providers,
possible common law responses to claims of injury, and the role of lawyers in developing
software programs).
31 See supra note 27 & accompanying text.
32 See Moore, supra note 9, at 225–27. In the United Kingdom, all employees of a
legal disciplinary practice (including practices owned by nonlawyers) are subject to the
regulations applicable to lawyers, including all the nonlawyers. Id. at 225–26. An
alternative business structure (which may provide multidisciplinary services) must have
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Many U.S. lawyers have questioned the efficacy of this form
of self-regulation in the context of nonlawyer ownership of both
law firms and multidisciplinary practices. For example, even if
the sole purpose of the firm is to provide legal services, critics
have argued that nonlawyer ownership will place undue pressure
on the lawyers to increase profits at the expense of client
interests.33 This particular concern is almost certainly
overstated, as many lawyers in lawyer-owned firms are “already
predominantly driven by this desire.”34 Other concerns include
conflicts of interest involving nonlawyer owners who have other
commercial interests likely to conflict with client interests.35
These concerns may be stronger in some forms of practice rather
than others,36 but it is unclear why these types of conflicts cannot
be addressed in the same way that law firms currently regulate
conflicts involving the law firm’s financial interest in
maintaining ties to its most lucrative clients.37
For example, consider the possibility that Walmart
will someday provide traditional legal services through
lawyer-employees who work in offices located within a Walmart
retail store.38 Conflicts may arise as a result of Walmart’s other
commercial interests, including prospective clients who want to

at least one manager authorized to practice law and must appoint a head of legal practice
to ensure compliance with the ABS license and to report to the licensing authority any
failure to comply with the terms of the license. Id.
33 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 30, at 46 (discussing concerns of others).
34 Robinson, supra note 30, at 46.
35 Id. at 46–47.
36 See, e.g., id. at 47 (discussing a large business process outsourcer with multiple
contracts with the U.K. government, which was running both the migrant removal
process and a government telephone hotline for indigents to access entitlement to legal
aid: author expresses fear over conflicts arising from the concern that confidential
information from immigrants who call the legal aid hotline might be shared with
employees running the migrant removal process).
37 Further, it should be noted that personal injury defense lawyers have been
permitted to practice in a law firm owned by the insurance company that funds the
defense even though such a practice appears to violate the letter of ethics rules that
prohibit lawyers from practicing in firms owned by a nonlawyer. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore,
The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are Special Solutions Required?,
4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259, 260 (1997).
38 Even prior to its passage, the 2007 Legal Services Act was dubbed “Tesco law”
because of the possibility that supermarkets like the English chain Tesco would be
providing legal services. See, e.g., Katherine H. Reardon, Note, It’s Not Your Business! A
Critique of the U.K. Legal Services Act of 2007 and Why Nonlawyers Should Not Own or
Manage Law Firms in the United States, 40 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 155, 156 (2012).
Tesco does indeed provide legal services in the United Kingdom today. See Legal, TESCO,
http://www.tesco-careers.com/Jobs-in-our-Office/Career-Path/Legal.aspx [http://perma.cc/
96XY-H82M]. Previously, in the United States, lawyers commonly referred to the specter
of legal services being offered by giant retailer Sears, Roebuck & Co. as a consequence of
permitting nonlawyer ownership of law firms. See, e.g., Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers
in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?
40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 578 (1989).
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sue one of Walmart’s major suppliers. If the lawsuit is related to
a matter involving Walmart, then the lawyer may have a
material limitation conflict under Rule 1.7.39 If the lawsuit is
unrelated to Walmart, then there would not be a directly adverse
conflict under that rule (because the supplier is not a “client” of
the Walmart law firm);40 however, if Walmart has a significant
financial interest in not disturbing its relationship with the
supplier, then there may be a so-called “punch pulling” conflict,41
which is yet another form of a material limitation conflict.42
Either way, the Walmart lawyers would be expected to identify
the conflict and deal with it accordingly, by either refusing the
proffered representation or obtaining the informed consent of
the client.43
Similarly, lawyers who provide legal services in the context
of a multidisciplinary practice should be able to address conflicts
of interest and other ethical issues, so long as the legal services
are provided in much the same way as in a traditional law firm.
Assume, for example, that a lawyer, an accountant, and a social
worker form a partnership to provide the different services
typically required in family law matters. The lawyer will be in
charge of providing the legal services, and will not permit her
nonlawyer partners to “direct or regulate the lawyer’s
professional judgment in rendering such legal services.”44 If there
are conflicts of interest arising from the partners’ relationships
with their own clients, these conflicts can be identified and
addressed as in traditional law firms or law firms owned by
nonlawyers, such as Walmart.45 To the extent that the nonlawyer
partners assist the lawyer in the provision of legal services, they

39 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(concurrent conflict exists if “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer”).
40 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (a conflict
of interest exists if “the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another
client”) (emphasis added).
41 See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 833, 884 n.196 (2005).
42 The concern is that the lawyer’s financial interest in pleasing the nonclient
adverse party “might tempt the lawyer the [sic] ‘pull her punches’ on behalf of a client.” Id.
43 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). This is
precisely what lawyers in England and Wales are currently required to do when
practicing in an alternative business structure. See Alternative Business Structures, THE
LAW SOCIETY, ¶4 http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practice-notes/
alternative-business-structures/ (“You may not be able to accept instructions from some
clients where aims of different parts of an ABS may conflict with a client’s best
interests.”) [http://perma.cc/RMC8-BKTM].
44 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (concerning
persons who recommend, employ, or pay a lawyer to render legal services).
45 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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would be subject to the supervision of the lawyer, as in any other
law firm.46
The more difficult challenges will come when lawyers become
more integrated with nonlawyers in the provision of services that
are not clearly or primarily legal services. For example, consider
Richard Susskind’s prediction that many future lawyers will
become “legal knowledge engineer[s]” working alongside business
and computer experts developing standardized working practices
and computer systems.47 Are they providing legal services or are
they providing interdisciplinary services that are not clearly or
solely legal?48 Should these lawyers be regulated by lawyer codes
or are they more like compliance officers, who may or may not
have a law degree but who are nonetheless knowledgeable about
the law?49
Legally trained compliance officers are but one of several
“quasi-legal” roles that lawyers have assumed in recent years.50
As Tanina Rostain has explained, many lawyers are now serving
as “law consultants,” working at corporate risk management
firms and employment law consulting firms that offer
“investigative, compliance, and other law-related services,”
purportedly “outside the confines of the attorney-client
relationship.” 51 Thus far, the assumption has been that these

46 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants, including nonlawyers “associated with
a lawyer”).
47 See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? 272 (2010). This is the role
that lawyers presumably play in companies that provide online legal documents or other
forms of online legal or law-related services, such as Legal Zoom. See supra notes 28–29
& accompanying text.
48 See supra note 29 (describing the likely role of lawyers in Legal Zoom’s software
product development and Legal Zoom’s efforts to downplay that role in order to avoid
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law). For a discussion of various efforts to
characterize Legal Zoom as engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, see, e.g., Moxley,
supra note 28, at 558.
49 See, e.g., Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1397, 1410 (2006) (“Recognizing that compliance expertise is not primarily legal,
regulations that require the designation of internal compliance personnel as part of a
compliance program do not specify that the corporate officer or employee in question be a
lawyer or have a law degree.”). For a more detailed discussion of the role of compliance
officers, see generally Michele DeStefano, Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the
Borders of Lawyers’ Monopoly and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
2961, 2964 (2014).
50 Rostain, supra note 49, at 1398. See generally Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The
Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63 DUKE L.J. 1243, 1246 (2014). Another example
of a “quasi-legal” service is legal process outsourcing, which includes “not only the
repetitive administrative functions associated with legal work and paralegal work, but
also the complex work involved in legal research, due diligence, contract negotiations,
etc.” Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen
or Stone Soup? 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2795 n.21 (2012).
51 Rostain, supra note 49, at 1398.
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“law consultants” are not practicing law.52 Indeed, to avoid any
contrary appearance, consulting firms emphasize that they do not
provide legal advice and avoid advertising their legally-trained
personnel as licensed lawyers.53
One potential benefit of explicitly permitting multidisciplinary
practices and other forms of alternative business structures is that
at least some of these “law consultants” may choose to
acknowledge and embrace the fact that the services they are
offering are in fact legal services. If so, then to the extent that
they provide these legal services in much the same way as in a
traditional law firm, they, too can be “self-regulated” in the
manner described above.54 However, other “law consultants” may
prefer to continue holding themselves out as performing nonlegal
services. As Rostain and others have noted, there are benefits to
the nonlawyer role, including the “fundamentally contractual
nature of the relationship with clients,”55 which avoids the
imposition of fiduciary duties to clients and special obligations to
third persons.56 Thus, although some lawyers now beyond the
pale of lawyer regulation may opt back into the self-regulatory
lawyer system, even more lawyers may now opt out of
that system.
What is to be done? Recall that I am positing that these
changes will occur,57 whether we want them to or not.58 Rostain
Id. at 1410–11; see also, e.g., Remus, supra note 50, at 1261–62.
See Rostain, supra note 49, at 1407 & n.51.
See supra notes 11–13 & accompanying text.
55 Rostain, supra note 49, at 1398.
56 Id. at 1420–25; see also Remus, supra note 50, at 1269–73 (referring to the ability
of some corporations to employ “ethical arbitrage” by using law consultants to perform
work that would otherwise be done by a lawyer). Rostain also notes the decreasing
advantages often thought to accrue as a result of hiring a lawyer in an attorney-client
relationship, i.e. the advantages of the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine, which she suggests are of less importance today due to pressures on companies
to waive such privileges in the context of government investigations. See Rostain, supra
note 49, at 1412–19.
57 Commentators have noted that at least the corporate side of the legal services
market is already moving toward effective deregulation, including not only the emergence
of consulting services, but also the rise of legal process outsourcing. See, e.g., Ray Worthy
Campbell, Rethinking Reg. and Innovation in the U.S. Legal Services Mkt., 9 N.Y.U. J.L.
& BUS. 1, 47–49 (2016).
58 Whether or not to permit either nonlawyer ownership of law firms or
multidisciplinary practices has been a continuing topic of debate. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N
ON ETHICS 20/20, ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING ALT. BUS. STRUCTURES (2011) (including
brief history of ABA’s consideration of nonlawyer ownership of law firms and other forms
of alternative business structures). The ABA recently confirmed its firm resistance to any
form of alternative business structures by rejecting a modest proposal to permit
nonlawyer professionals to participate in the ownership of law firms. See ABA COMM’N ON
ETHICS 20/20, ABA COMM’N WILL NOT PROPOSE CHANGES TO ABA POLICY PROHIBITING
NONLAWYER OWNERSHIP OF LAW FIRMS (2012). For a recent discussion of the pros and
cons of nonlawyer ownership of legal services, see Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t
Get All the Profits: Non-lawyer Ownership, Access and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL
52
53
54
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finds it “difficult to envision a successful regulatory strategy to
address” the risk that law consultants will use “their expertise
and authority in ways that may harm the interests of employees
and other third parties.”59 Dana Remus proposes that, in order to
avoid this form of “ethical arbitrage,”60 lawyers in “quasi-legal”
roles who want to retain their professional licenses should be
forced to accept the “obligations of professional regulation.”61
This would entail expanded professional rules tailored explicitly
to the new law consultant.62
But not all law consultants, including legal knowledge
engineers,63 are nefariously seeking to avoid professional
regulation.64 And it seems highly unlikely that lawyers will
succeed in extending their current authority to routinely regulate
the lawyers who perform such “quasi-legal” roles.65 In situations
where there is genuine confusion regarding whether an
attorney-client relationship has been formed, then-existing law is
probably sufficient to impose current regulatory requirements on
these lawyers and their firms.66
If and when the use of law consultants raises an
unreasonable risk of corporate overreaching or other harm to
third persons or the public, then we should trust judges and
legislators to regulate these practices in the same way they
choose to regulate (or not) other providers of commercial services.
Although it is true that the political will is probably lacking to
enact any comprehensive regulation of law consulting (or

ETHICS 1, 53–54 (2016) (concluding, contrary to most academic commentators and other
competition advocates, that it is unlikely that deregulatory approaches will make legal
services more affordable and identifying challenges to professionalism).
59 Rostain, supra note 49, at 1425.
60 See Remus, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
61 Remus, supra note 50, at 1276.
62 Id. at 1277–85.
63 See SUSSKIND, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
64 See, e.g., Rostain, supra note 49, at 1409–10 (detailing how some compliance
regimes “require the deployment of multidisciplinary expertise,” including the design of
systems that “interweave[] legal, financial, and software expertise”).
65 See id. at 1425–26 (lawyers might seek to protect third parties by extending the
meaning of legal practice to include legal consultants, but “[p]roposing an expanded
definition of law practice would also meet significant resistance on a variety
of . . . grounds, including its detrimental effects on the capacity of the public to obtain
access to the legal system”). But see Remus, supra note 50, at 1284–85 (acknowledging
significant obstacles to these types of reforms, but concluding that such reform is possible
if state courts take the lead).
66 In determining whether an attorney-client relationship has been formed, “[c]ourts
are alert to what a person claiming to be a client might reasonably have believed under
the circumstances, especially if the person has given the lawyer confidential information
to enable the lawyer to perform a legal service that would benefit that person . . . .”
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 24 (9th ed. 2012). See generally Susan R.
Martyn, Accidental Clients, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 919 (2005).
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consulting generally),67 specific problems can be addressed on a
piecemeal basis, which is how most businesses are currently
regulated. Such a piecemeal approach may not be ideal, but
neither is the current regulation of the legal profession, given the
many disadvantages of lawyer self-governance.68
When lawyers and nonlawyers are truly integrated in a
practice, it is probably true that lawyers cannot be regulated in
the same manner as lawyers providing more traditional legal
services. But this state of affairs does not necessarily mean the
end of either lawyers or lawyer self-regulation. Even in
Susskind’s world of the future,69 many, perhaps even most
lawyers will continue to provide legal services in more or less
traditional attorney-client relationships, although the work may
not always be of the customized, or bespoke, variety.70 And in
this future world, it may well be that lawyer self-regulation,
albeit in a somewhat different form, will continue to be both
possible and even desirable. We shall see.

67
68
69
70

See Rostain, supra note 49, at 1426.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See SUSSKIND, supra note 47, at 271.

